Published on:

by

In this case, the appellate court considered whether evidence should have been suppressed because the defendant’s consent to having his car searched was not voluntary.

In People v. Wright-Hale, the arresting officer went to a hotel in Queens in response to a 911 emergency call that someone was banging on a hotel room door with a firearm. When the arresting officer arrived several other officers were already on the scene.  They were talking to the defendant in the hallway.  The arresting officer entered the hotel room and learned from the room’s occupant, the defendant’s ex-girlfriend, that the defendant was known to carry a gun.  The arresting officer then asked the defendant for permission to search his car.  He gave permission, gave the officer his keys, and told the officer which car belonged to him.  The officer found a gun in a shoebox in the trunk of the defendant’s car.

The defendant was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun and statements that the defendant made to the police.  The court denied the motion. The defendant was eventually convicted. He appealed on the grounds that the evidence of the gun should have been suppressed because the officer had no reason to suspect criminal activity.  The defendant also argued that the search was involuntary because of the presence of so many police officers and because the arresting officer did not inform the defendant that he had the right to refuse permission to search his car.

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

In the case of People v. Sloley, the Appellate Court considered the question as to whether the jury properly concluded that a defendant constructively possessed a firearm.  Constructive possession is a legal doctrine which allows prosecutors to bring criminal charges and potentially obtain convictions for possessory offenses in cases where the contraband was not actually found physically on the defendant.

In 2016, the defendant was pulled over by law enforcement for speeding. When he officer returned to his car to write the speeding ticket, the defendant then fled.  At one point during the chase, the defendant drove behind a building and the police lost sight of him.  He then reappeared and crashed. The police searched the area behind the building where the defendant had driven during the chase and found a handgun with the help of a canine. As a result, the defendant was charged with a variety of crimes and eventually convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, unlawful fleeing from a police officer in a motor vehicle in the third degree, and reckless driving.  Because he was a second violent felony offender, the defendant was sentenced to 14 years in prison followed by five years of postrelease supervision. The defendant appealed the conviction.

The basis of the defendant’s appeal of the firearms charge was that the prosecution did not establish that he had possession of the gun. For a possession charge the law requires that the defendant must have exercised “dominion or control over the property by a sufficient level of control over the area in which the contraband is found.” People v McCoy, 169 AD3d 1260, 1262 [2019].  In this case no one witnessed the defendant with possession of the gun and no one witnessed the defendant discard the gun.  A deputy sheriff testified that the defendant fled in his vehicle behind the building where the gun was found.  He further testified that the handgun was relatively clean and not weathered, indicating that it had been placed in the area recently.  Furthermore, the defendant’s DNA was found on the gun as well as a hat that was found in the area where the gun was found.

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

In People v. McCoy, the defendant was convicted of three counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and four counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The convictions were based on the defendant being found to have constructively possessed a gun. Constructive possession of a firearm occurs when a defendant was not found in actual physical possession of the firearm, but was found to have had control over the area where the firearm was found.  After being sentenced to 12 years in prison, the defendant appealed his convictions.

The defendant’s arrest stems from an incident during which the defendant’s live-in girlfriend observed the defendant hammering a step in the attic of these in which they lived.  The next day, when the defendant was out of the house, she pulled up the step and found a plastic bag containing several guns. After showing her sister, who also lived in the house, the girlfriend called the police.  The police arrived at the house and removed the guns.  However, no fingerprints or DNA were found on the gun.  In addition to the defendant, the girlfriend, the girlfriend’s sister, the downstairs neighbors also had access to the attic.  Nonetheless, the defendant was arrested and charged with several charges of criminal possession of a weapon.

On appeal, the defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence.  Because several other people had access to the attic and because his DNA was not found on the guns, the defendant argued that there was not sufficient evidence presented at trial to support a finding that he exercised dominion and control over the area in which the guns were found.  Thus, the defendant concluded, the jury should not have convicted him of criminal possession of a weapon. Even though on appeal the court found that the defendant did not raise this particular argument in his motion to dismiss, the court still reviewed this issue in the context of evaluating whether all elements of the charged crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

In a case where the defendant was charged with 75 counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree and criminal possession of a forgery device, during a suppression hearing the defendant moved to have the physical evidence seized from his trunk  suppressed due to an illegal inventory search.

An inventory search is a warrantless search that the police are permitted to conduct in connection with lawfully impounding a vehicle. In order for any evidence collected in an inventory search to be admissible, the inventory search must be reasonable and must be conducted according to established police procedure designed to meet legitimate objectives.  The objectives of an inventory search are threefold:  first, to protect the property of the owner while it is in the custody of the police; second, to protect the police against claims that property was lost, stolen, or damaged; third, to protect the police from dangerous items in the vehicle that might be hidden.  While the police may find incriminating evidence during an inventory search, a legitimate reason for an inventory search is not find incriminating evidence.

In Espinoza, during the suppression hearing the court found problems with the way the inventory search was conducted. When the defendant was stopped by a deputy sheriff for speeding, the defendant was arrested because he was driving on a suspended license.  The passenger was also arrested because of an outstanding warrant. While waiting for the tow, the deputy sheriff searched the defendant’s wallet and the vehicle and discovered several forged debit and credit cards, as well as a card reader.

by
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

Under New York law, if a person is pulled over for suspected driving while under the influence of alcohol, the driver must submit to a chemical test (breath, blood, urine, or saliva), as a matter of “implied consent.” This does not mean that drivers absolutely have to submit to a chemical test. The purpose of the implied consent rule is to encourage drivers to consent and obviate the need to get court orders authorizing blood tests.  Drivers can certainly refuse to take a breathalyzer or other chemical test.  However, with refusal comes the serious consequence of a 6 month license suspension and a $300 fine. If the driver refuses again within 5 years of a previous DWI related offense, the consequences are a mandatory 1 year license suspension and a $750 fine.  These penalties are in addition to any penalties related to a DWI or similar offense conviction.

In People v. Odum, defendant Odum was arrested for DWI and taken to the police station. He was not asked to take a breathalyzer until over two hours after he arrived at the police station.  He refused.  The police officer then gave Odum the statutory warning related to the consequences of refusing the breathalyzer, including that Odum’s refusal to consent to the breathalyzer would be used against him as evidence in his trial.  After hearing the refusal warnings, Odum changed his mind and consented to the breath test which confirmed that his blood alcohol level was over the legal limit.  Odum later petitioned the court to suppress the breath test and his initial refusal to take it.

The rules related to the breath test requirement are detailed and clear. Because of New York’s implied consent provisions, a refusal to take the breath test or any other chemical test in conjunction with being stopped on suspension of driving while drunk is a violation of the law  with consequences. A driver can be convicted of refusing to take a chemical test and be acquitted of DWI charges.

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

Defendant Walker was indicted for several felonies including murder in the second degree (felony murder) (N.Y. Pen. Law §  125.25[3] ), two counts of kidnapping in the second degree (N.Y. Pen. Law §  135.20), robbery in the first degree (N.Y. Pen. Law §  160.15[2] ), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (N.Y. Pen. Law §  265.03[1] ), and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (N.Y. Pen. Law §  265.02[1], [4]).  He was ultimately convicted of several crimes including felony murder. As part of his defense, he claimed justification.  However, the trial judge disallowed the defense of justification. On appeal, Walker argues that he should have been allowed to argue justification.

Justification, also referred to as self-defense, is an oft used defense to criminal charges such as murder and assault.  It an affirmative defense governed by N.Y. Pen. Law §  35.15.  The law allows a person to use physical force against another if he possesses an honest and reasonable belief that he is facing unlawful physical force or an imminent threat of unlawful physical force.  In the absence of an honest and reasonable belief of that he is facing unlawful force or a threat, the use of such physical force would be a crime.

While it is well-established that a person has the legal right to use physical force that would otherwise amount to murder or assault, the question in his case is whether a person has the right to use physical force that would otherwise amount to felony murder.

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

In a possession of a controlled substance case, the court considered whether the police officers properly stopped and arrested the defendant for disorderly conduct.  When the officers stopped the defendant, they found cocaine on his person, leading to a charge of possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree.

The events that eventually led to the defendant’s conviction on a drug charge started when the three police officers who were on patrol in an unmarked car observed the defendant running down a sidewalk and across a street into oncoming traffic. A couple of cars had to slow down as the defendant ran across the street in front of them. The officers decided to issue the defendant a summons for disorderly conduct because he ran across the street disrupting traffic.  In other words, by running across the street into traffic, the police officers had concluded that the had reasonable cause to believe that the defendant was committed the crime of disorderly conduct.  However, when they approached the defendant, they observed him clutching something in his waistband and feared that he had a weapon.  The officers ordered the defendant to put his hands in the air, handcuffed him, and searched him. They discovered a knife in the defendant’s pocket along with 5 clear bags of cocaine.  The defendant was eventually convicted of attempted possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree.

Under N.Y. Pen. Code § 240.20[5], a person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof he obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. For the police to have found that there was reasonable or probable cause to stop and arrest the defendant, his actions must have led them to believe that the defendant was intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk that public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm would occur. The court found that merely causing 2 cars to momentarily slow down did not amount to disorderly conduct, but was only a momentary inconvenience at best.  This was not sufficient to satisfy the public inconvenience or annoyance element.

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

In this case the defendant denies charges of child endangerment despite being found drunk and unconscious with two young children she was supposed to be caring for.

Early one morning a police sergeant found defendant Perez in the back seat of a cab with two infant children next to her.  Perez was unconscious and appeared to be intoxicated.  She was arrested and charged with two misdemeanor counts of endangering a child under N.Y. Pen. Law § 260.10(1) and (2).  Despite the observation of the police sergeant who found her, Perez filed a motion to dismiss the changes, arguing that the prosecution did not establish a prima facie case of child endangerment.

The charges against Perez are based largely on the observations of the police sergeant who found Perez slumped over in the back seat of a cab.  When the sergeant called out to her, she eventually woke up.  Her eyes were watery and bloodshot, she smelled of alcohol, she was unsteady on her feet, and she slurred when she spoke.  When the sergeant asked about the two children she seemed to have forgotten that they were with her.  She responded, “What kids? I don’t have any kids with me.”  The children appeared to be between 1 and 2 years old.

by
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

This case looks at how the court determines the sex offender status of a convicted felon.  Under New York’s New York Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), sometimes referred to as Megan’s Law, those who are convicted of most sex crimes and other serious felonies are required to register with the New York Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) for at least 20 years.

Those who are required to register are classified into one of three different risk levels.  The restrictions that are placed on registrants and the length of registration depend on the registration level. A Level 1 classification is given to offenders who present the lowest level of risk of reoffending while Level 3 is given to those who present the highest level of risk of reoffending.  Risk levels can be raised or lowered. For example, if an offender commits another crime or violates probation or parole, the court may raise the offender’s risk level.  If an offender feels that his (or her) risk level should be lower, he can request a hearing to request that the court lower his risk level.  An offender can even request that the court completely relieve him from the registration requirements.

In Simmons, the defendant was convicted of attempted rape in the first degree and two counts of murder in the first degree and was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.  Prior to his release from prison, a hearing was held regarding his sex offender registration status.  The defendant was designated a level 3 sex offender.  He received this designation because of the “presumptive override” that was applicable in his case because his crime resulted in the death of the victim.

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Published on:

by

People v Y

Decision

This is an appeal by the defendant from a Supreme Court judgment, which was decided on February 7, 2013. The defendant was convicted of first degree sexual conduct against a child (3 counts), second degree sexual conduct against a child (two counts), second degree criminal sexual acts (16 counts), second degree sexual abuse (27 counts), third-degree sexual abuse (24 counts), and endangering the welfare of a child (3 counts).

by
Posted in:
Published on:
Updated:
Contact Information