In the late evening on the 24th of October, the defendant along with another individual accosted and robbed a victim as she was walking along a street in Manhattan. The defendant displayed what looked like a handgun, but was just a toy pistol. The other individual had a knife.
The defendant and the other individual were arrested and by way of a four count indictment were charged with first degree robbery, two counts of second degree robbery, and first degree criminal use of a firearm.
This is an appeal from a judgment made by the County Court of Albany County. The defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery in the second degree.
Case Background
The criminal defendant man was indicted for the crimes of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree and grand larceny in the second degree. On August 10, 1978 the defendant moved for a dismissal of the indictment on the ground that he was not given an opportunity to testify before the grand jury, although timely notice to that effect was served upon the district attorney. On August 25, 1978 the accused man’s motion was heard. The complainant conceded that the defendant man was not notified to appear as a witness before the grand jury, but would not consent to a dismissal on that ground. The complainant moved that, instead, the indictment be dismissed in the interests of justice. The defendant joined in the complainant’s motion and the indictment was dismissed on that ground.
Thereafter, on August 28, 1978, the complainant’s instant application for leave to resubmit was argued. The complainant alleged that through inadvertence, leave to submit the charges to another grand jury and to make the dismissal conditional upon the defendant testifying under a waiver of immunity was not requested. Credit card fraud was not involved.
A man was indicted on two counts of robbery in the second degree. But, he pleads not guilty to both indictments, with a reason of insanity and he was thereafter sent to the hospital for observation. The hospital reported that he was unable to understand the nature of the criminal charges and to make a defense. The court then transported him to the state hospital. Later, the man was pronounced recovered by the state hospital, but at the court’s direction he was sent to another hospital for re-examination. The hospital reported that he was still unable to understand the nature of the charges and to make a defense. The man was again committed to another state hospital. Consequently, the man appeared in county court contending that he was capable to stand on trial for his charges.
After a hearing, he was remanded to the state hospital for further treatment. Thirteen days later, the man escaped from the hospital and was at large. He was thereafter indicted for the crimes of kidnapping, robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the first degree and assault in the second degree. The court then committed the man to the psychiatric division which reported that the man was normal, and was capable of understanding the charges against him and of making his defense.
On October 11, 1994, the defendant is accused of having burglarized a person and forcibly stolen their wallet, a checkbook, and a car. On October 12 and 13, 1994, he is charged with forging and cashing two of the stolen checks. After a jury trial, he was convicted of eight of the 17 offenses that he was originally charged with. He was sentenced to 5 ½ to 16 ½ years of prison. He filed an appeal. His contention was that his trial counsel denied him effective assistance.
The situation that he referred to occurred during pretrial hearings of his case. His public defender was given the witness list. He recognized one of the names on the list as a woman who had previously been represented by his office. He pulled her file and discovered confidential information relating to her substance abuse problem and treatment. He immediately notified the county court that he had a conflict in representing the defendant because he felt that effective counsel would use this information to impeach the witness. He felt that the information was relevant to the credibility of the witness and should be used in cross-examination of her on the stand. However, he was not allowed to use the information because it was attorney client privilege that he would not have if his office had not defended her. The defendant stated repeatedly that he wanted the court to allow that information to be heard. He continued to demand it even after the court had advised him that the information could not be used to impeach the witness under the Mental Hygiene Law § 23.05.
A man was charged with robbery in the second degree as an armed and violent Class C felony. He pled guilty to a Class D violent felony offense in exchange for a prison sentence of one to three years. At that time, the court agreed to consider an application for a less sentence based on mitigating circumstances. The court later found that there was insufficient mitigating evidence to support a shorter term than he had already received. He then challenged the court’s decision, alleging a violation of his due process rights. The court rejected his claim. At the sentencing hearing, his criminal defense attorney filed another application for a shorter sentence, which was also denied.
The case was then referred to the Supreme Court Appellate Division to address defendant’s constitutional claim. After reviewing New York Penal Law, the court determined that the prison term he received was appropriate and that the lower acted within the boundaries of its discretion in handing down the sentence. Accordingly, his plea arrangement and sentence were affirmed.
Two men were indicted on January 28, 1977, for murder in the second degree and attempted robbery in the first degree. A woman was also indicted for the same counts but pled guilty to attempted robbery and testified for the prosecution at trial. According to court documents, the three and another man attempted to rob another in his home. During the attempted robbery, the owner was shot in the head. He died a few days after the incident. Had his home been unoccupied at the time the four individuals broke into his home with the intent to steal, his life might have been spared and the defendants may only have been charged with burglary.
Three weeks after the robbery occurred, one of the robbers was arrested and given a Miranda warning. He then made a statement to police in writing, which he signed. A second written statement was later given to an assistant district attorney. In these two statements, he claimed that he and his partner had developed a plan to make money, which involved the robbery of the house. The two men met with another before going to the woman’s home to further discuss the robbery. They forced their way into the apartment. One pointed a gun at the owner but stated he had never intended to harm him. A struggle ensued and the gun went off, causing the injuries to the owner. Both theives then left the scene.
Two separate robberies occurred in parking garages on the East Side of Manhattan in August of 1982. On August 17, A and two other individuals stole two cars after threatening the parking attendant with a gun. A few days later on August 20, 1982, B, who had participated in the first robbery, picked A up from his mother’s home. Another robbery occurred in a different parking garage and Colon and Tisdale were later seen showing off one of the four cars that were stolen to other people in the neighborhood. The parking attendant who worked at the second garage was found dead on the floor of the garage office. He had been killed with a shotgun and fingerprint evidence suggested that B but not A had been present in the office. Despite this evidence, Mr. A was convicted of second degree murder and first, second and third degree robbery. He was sentenced as a violent offender and received 15 years to life for the murder, 6 to 12 years each for the first and second degree robbery counts and 3 to 6 years for the third degree robbery count. The judge ordered the sentences to run concurrently with one another but consecutively with another sentence of 12 ½ to 25 years for an unrelated conviction.
Mr. A appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial court committed an error in denying his motion to vacate the judgment based on insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court Appellate Division, first Department was charged with determining whether his appeal had any merit.
W was convicted of four counts of first degree robbery, two counts of robbery in the second degree four counts of grand larceny in the third degree. Mr. W appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court Appellate Division.
The appellate court held that Mr. W’s conviction on the second degree robbery and third degree grand larceny counts should be reversed. The majority argued that under New York law, when a verdict is comprised of inclusory concurrent counts, a guilty verdict on the highest count of the indictment is essentially a dismissal of the lesser included counts. The court held that the evidence demonstrated that Mr. W had committed the robbery with three other individuals who were armed at the time. Based on the facts of the case, the court reasoned that Mr. W could not have committed robbery in the first degree without also committing the other crimes included in the indictment. Under New York law, one of the elements of first degree robbery involves the threat or use of force and/or the display or use of a weapon. Had no weapon been present at the time the crime was committed, Mr. W would likely have been charged with second or third degree robbery or a lesser count of larceny.
B was charged with one count of robbery in the third degree. On April 9th, 2010, Mr. B allegedly stole $140 from Nellisha Gregory, who worked for a Syracuse branch Bank of America. According to the indictment issued against him, Mr. B took the money by force. This is important to note since the New York Penal Code defines robbery as the forcible stealing of another person’s property. Had the indictment not claimed that Mr. B used force, he may have only been charged with petty larceny or another minor crime. Had Mr. Brown used a weapon or other dangerous instrument in the commission of the robbery, the charge may have been elevated to robbery in the first degree.
Mr. B’s criminal defense attorney filed a motion with the Onondaga County Court on the grounds that the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was insufficient to support a charge of third degree robbery. The court was charged with determining whether the acts committed by Mr. B satisfied the elements of robbery in the third degree as defined under New York law. For purposes of the Grand Jury proceedings, the standard of proof is prima facie evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
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