Articles Posted in Manhattan

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A New York Criminal Lawyer reports that DWI in NY: Driving While Intoxicated – VTL 1192.3 Driving While Intoxicated is a dangerous habit among the drivers in the country. It is said that it is not just dangerous; the law likewise punished the drivers who are found to be intoxicated while driving. Driving While Intoxicated is just a part of crimes which are punishable while driving, the law also provides for the following crimes which can be violated while driving – DWI (Driving While Intoxicated), DWAI (Driving While Ability Impaired) and DUI (Driving Under the Influence) – but regardless of the particular offense in New York (both NYC and Westchester), prosecutors and judges take these charges very seriously.

A New York DWI Lawyer said that we have handled numerous DWIs, DWAIs and DUIs here in our firm, whether they are charged as VTL 1192.1, VTL 1192.2, VTL 1192.2-a or VTL 1192.3. A particular question which a layman frequently asked us is “how can I be charged with DWI if there is no breathalyzer or intoxilizer that indicates how much alcohol I had in my system?” In answering their question, we first ask for the circumstances surrounding their problem. Once we already determined the main problem, we give them an advice which will benefit them. In the question stated above, the answer is quite simple. As we call it in the criminal law field, a person can be held liable for DWI even without a chemical test. This can be done by using the observation of the arresting officer based on the appearance of the driver and if indeed the latter was intoxicated. This is also known as the “Common Law” DWI.

With the use of the personal observation of the arresting officer, it is different from the forms of DWI using a chemical test. In VTL 1192.2 which requires a reading of alcohol in a person’s blood to be .08 of one per centum or more, a person is guilty of Driving While Intoxicated pursuant to “Common Law” VTL 1192.3 if they operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said a person is charged with unlawful receipt of fare for providing access to Transit Authority facilities, a violation, petit larceny, and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, both class A misdemeanors. He moved to dismiss the latter two charges of the Criminal Court complaint, pursuant to CPL 170.30, asserting that the People’s complaint is facially insufficient. He is alleged in the Criminal Court complaint to have been observed by the deponent, Police Officer, as “wrongfully taking from two individuals a sum of United States Currency that would otherwise have been paid to the Transit Authority as lawful fares from said individuals, in exchange for which he swiped a Metrocard through the subway turnstile for each of these individuals, thereby allowing the said individuals to enter the transit system beyond the turnstiles.” The officer goes on to allege that, upon his arrest, the offender was in possession of two unlimited ride Metrocards, for which he did not have permission or authority to authorize access to the transit system for other individuals.

His motion is granted in part, and denied in part for the reasons stated below:

Under CPL 100.15, every accusatory instrument must contain two elements: (1) an accusatory portion designating the offense charged, and (2) a factual portion containing evidentiary facts which support or tend to support the charges stated in the accusatory portion of the instrument. These facts must provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the crime alleged in the accusatory portion of the accusatory instrument. Further, under CPL 100.40, a misdemeanor information is facially sufficient if the non hearsay facts stated in said information establish two things: (1) each and every element of the offense charged, and (2) the defendant’s commission of said crime. If both these factors are present, then the information states a prima facie case, and is sufficient.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said this is an Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered November 7, 1980, convicting him of possession of burglar’s tools, attempted criminal trespass in the second degree and attempted petit larceny, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

A Kings County Criminal lawyer said that on March 8, 1980 the complainant was alone in her fifth floor apartment when she heard a knock at her door. She did not answer as she was undressed at the time and was not expecting any company. After hearing a noise, she approached the door and observed that someone was at her door and was trying to gain entry. She then called the police, heard children in the hall and heard whoever was at the door walk away. Upon patting down the codefendant, a loaded revolver was recovered and a search of the appellant yielded a key with which the arresting officer was able to unlock one of the locks on the complainant’s apartment door.

At trial, nine-year-old twin sisters identified the appellant and the codefendant as the two men who had been at the complainant’s door and both testified that appellant had asked if they knew a certain individual. One of the girls identified the appellant as the man who put the key in complainant’s door.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said that the defendant is charged with petit larceny arising out of a “buy and bust” operation in which the undercover officer allegedly gave the defendant US currency and the defendant fled without providing the officer with the agreed upon crack cocaine. The defendant moves to dismiss the information for facial insufficiency.

A Kings County Criminal attorney said that the deponent is informed by an undercover officer known to him that, at the above time and place, the defendant did engage informant in a drug related conversation whereupon defendant agreed to sell informant a quantity of crack cocaine in exchange for a sum of U.S. currency. Deponent further states that informant gave defendant a sum of U.S. currency, whereupon defendant took informant’s currency and left. Defendant is further informed by informant that informant is the custodian of said U.S. currency and that defendant did not have permission or authority to take said sum.”

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that section 155.25 of the Penal Law states that “[a] person is guilty of petit larceny when he steals property.” Section 155.05[1] of the Penal Law provides that “[a] person steals property and commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.”

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said in two related child protective proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, the father appeals (1) from an amended order of disposition of the Family Court, Nassau County, dated July 17, 2007, which, upon an order of the same court dated May 9, 2007, granting the motion of the Nassau County Department of Social Services for summary judgment on the issues of whether the father abused the child NP and derivatively neglected the child AP, and after a dispositional hearing, in effect, adjudicated that the father abused NP. and derivatively neglected AP, and directed him to comply with the terms and conditions of an order of protection dated July 17, 2007, and (2) from an order of protection of the same court also dated July 17, 2007, which directed the father to stay away from the two children until July 16, 2008, except for supervised visitation with the child AP, and which further directed that he refrain from communication with the two children until July 16, 2008, except for therapeutic contact as approved by the Nassau County Department of Social Services.

In March 2006 the Nassau County Department of Social Services (hereinafter DSS) filed two petitions pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, alleging, among other things, that the father sexually abused and/or severely sexually abused the child NP. Each petition alleged that, between 1999 and 2005, the father engaged in oral sodomy and intercourse with NP. The petitions alleged that there were, in total, about 20 such acts. In November 2006 the father was convicted in the County Court, Nassau County, upon his plea of guilty, of rape in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.35), criminal sexual act in the first degree (two counts) (Penal Law § 130.50), and incest (Penal Law § 255.25), for acts he committed against NP. As part of its disposition, the County Court entered an order of protection effective until March 2, 2024. The County Court Judge stated, on the record, “I am relinquishing ultimate jurisdiction of how long this order is to stay in full force and effect to a family court judge who will have better input, in that, there will be a law guardian representing the child’s interest at that point.”

A New York Criminal Lawyer said after the convictions, DSS moved for summary judgment on the Family Court Act article 10 petitions based upon the criminal convictions and the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Family Court granted the motion, finding that the father sexually abused NP and derivatively neglected AP. In July 2007, the Family Court held a dispositional hearing, at which the father argued that the Family Court had jurisdiction to amend the County Court’s order of protection to permit some contact between NP and him. The Family Court rejected the father’s argument, and issued a one-year order of protection, which expired on July 18, 2008, and an amended order of disposition directing, among other things, that the father comply with the Family Court order of protection.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said the plaintiff seeks a declaration that it is not obligated to defend or indemnify PB, among others, in an underlying action arising out of an incident which occurred on February 12, 1992.

On that date the defendant CS opened a door of his vehicle which hit a door of the vehicle of the appellant. The ensuing events are unclear. What is clear is that CS was injured when he was struck in the face by the appellant.

As a result of this incident the appellant was charged with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00[1] ). Thereafter, on August 6, 1992, he was adjudicated a youthful offender. All official records and papers relating to the youthful offender proceeding were sealed as confidential pursuant to CPL 720.35.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said that on January 24, 1984, at approximately 7:50 P.M., two employees of the X Establishment were robbed by two assailants, one of whom carried a sawed-off shotgun. Fifteen days later, on February 8, 1984, in Queens County, the defendant was repairing an automobile registered in his girlfriend’s name when he was approached by two police officers and a civilian, the latter of whom identified the defendant as the person who had just taken a shot at him. The defendant was placed under arrest and police officers seized from a leather bag which was located in the trunk of the defendant’s girlfriend’s car a loaded sawed-off shotgun and separately packaged ammunition. The defendant was subsequently charged with reckless endangerment in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.

It is not disputed that in the Queens prosecution, the defendant moved to suppress the sawed-off shotgun and ammunition, and the Supreme Court, Queens County, denied him that relief. Rendered after an evidentiary hearing at which the defendant did not testify, the denial was apparently premised on a variety of grounds, including that, because the car was not in his name, the defendant had no standing to protest the search.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that in May 1984 the defendant was identified as the unarmed half of the duo which robbed the Establishment in January 1984. On September 4, 1984, a Nassau County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with two counts of robbery in the first degree. On or about September 13, 1984, the defendant proceeded to trial without a jury on the Queens County charges and the court found the defendant not guilty of all counts.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said the petitioner requests a judgment prohibiting the enforcement of an order of Respondent, a District Court Judge, dated June 20, 1978, which rescinded Respondent’s earlier order dated December 5, 1977, granting an application pursuant to CPL 180.50, to reduce the charge of burglary in the Nassau County District Court, felony complaint number 2XX-1XX, to criminal trespass in the second degree.

Petitioner brings on this CPLR Article 78 proceeding since Petitioner claims that Respondent exceeded his authorized powers by rescinding the order granting the reduction of the charge against Petitioner.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the District Attorney of Nassau County not only does not oppose this application but joins in the application. He has also brought two other proceedings against the same Respondent for the very same declaration and direction that Petitioner requests.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, in an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants, separately appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, entered December 14, 1990, as denied their respective motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and the cross claims against the Company, Inc.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, in November 1986 the plaintiff was raped and sodomized in the laundry room of the cooperative garden apartment development in which she lived. The assailant, a house guest of an employee of the sales agent of the Company, Inc., was convicted of the rape. The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against the tenants’ corporation, the sales agent, the partnership that originally developed the garden apartments, and its individual partners, alleging, inter alia, that negligent maintenance of the premises contributed to the rape and, further, that the sales agent was liable in respondeat superior for the negligence of its employee in entertaining the rapist as a house guest.

The issue in his case is whether plaintiff can recover damages for personal injuries.

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A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, in this habeas corpus proceeding, it appears that after a trial by jury, the petitioner was convicted of rape in the first degree (under Subdivision 3 of Section 2010 of the Penal Law) and was sentenced by the County Court of Nassau County to state prison at Sing Sing for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which was to be one day and the maximum was to be for the duration of his natural life. The petitioner contends that he is illegally detained and he urges four grounds in support of his position.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, under the first ground, the petitioner contends that since his aforesaid minimum term was for less than one year, the County Judge was authorized and empowered only to order his confinement in a county jail or county penitentiary and that his existing sentence to state prison was illegal and in violation of Sections 2181 and 2183 of the Penal Law. In this Court’s opinion, this contention may not be sustained, for the rule seems clear that with respect to the controversy and issue here presented, an indeterminate sentence is in effect a sentence for the maximum term. And in amplification of this rule, it has been held that since parole is not a right but an act of grace, the Court, in imposing an indeterminate sentence, must have had in mind those provisions of the Correction Law which relate to parole and must be deemed to have sentenced the prisoner to his maximum term, subject to the discretionary power of the

Further, a Manhattan Criminal Lawyer said from a reading of the 1950 amendments to Section 212 and 214 of the Correction Law which were enacted to supplement the 1950 amendment to Section 2010 of the Penal Law, this Court holds that the Legislature clearly intended to authorize and direct the trial judge to sentence a defendant of proper age who had had been convicted of rape in the first degree to a state prison where the board of parole of this State would have jurisdiction over the defendant, including the matter of his release on parole, and which board, in considering the defendant’s release on parole, would have the benefit of reports of physical, mental and psychiatric examinations required to be made at the regular intervals specified by statute.

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