Long Island

Published on: October 26, 2014

Court Discusses Elements of Petit Larceny

From the records, in a Criminal Court Complaint, the People assert that a Police Officer observed the offenders at the Subway station. The officer allegedly watched the offenders “acting in concert” receive United States currency from four individuals, “in exchange for which the offenders swiped a Metrocard through the subway turnstile for each of these individuals, thereby allowing the said individuals to enter the transit system.”

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the offenders were charged with Petit Larceny, five counts of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree, and Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree, all Class A misdemeanors. By motion, one of the offenders seeks the dismissal of all charges contained in the Criminal Court Complaint, asserting that the People’s complaint is facially insufficient and pursuant to CPL Sec. 170.35, 100.40 and 100.15, asserting that the People’s complaint is facially insufficient.

Their motions were granted in part, and denied in part for the reasons stated below:

Published on: October 22, 2014

Defendant Contends Evidence was Illegally Obtained

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered September 16, 2008, convicting him of murder in the second degree, vehicular manslaughter in the first degree, aggravated driving while intoxicated (DWI), operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, at around midnight on October 18 to 19, 2007, the defendant went to the Island Rock nightclub in Hempstead with his girlfriend, a friend of his girlfriend, and another individual. After drinking alcohol at the nightclub, the defendant and the other individual left and went to a nearby parking lot. The friend of the defendant’s girlfriend testified that the defendant did not appear intoxicated at that time. According to him, the defendant stated in the parking lot “I lost my shit,” presumably referring to drugs, and the defendant became upset. The defendant went into the trunk of his car and searched for something. The defendant then began arguing with his girlfriend. At approximately 3:15 A.M., several witnesses heard gunshots, but no one reported having seen the defendant fire a gun. The defendant then angrily ordered said friend to leave with his girlfriend, which he did, driving the defendant’s girlfriend home. The defendant and the other individual then entered the defendant’s vehicle, with the defendant driving. When police officers arrived at the parking lot only minutes later, at about 3:20 A.M., the defendant had left, and the officers recovered several 9-millimeter shell casings in the parking lot.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, thereafter, at approximately 3:30 A.M., the defendant’s vehicle was seen traveling west in the eastbound lanes of the Southern State Parkway at a speed of 70 to 75 miles per hour. According to numerous witnesses, the defendant’s vehicle traveled in the wrong direction from about exit 19 to exit 13, a distance of approximately five miles. A witness observed the defendant driving directly at him while changing lanes. That witness had to immediately pull his vehicle onto the shoulder to avoid a collision. This witness saw that the defendant continued driving the wrong way, and the witness observed the other vehicles on the parkway “split apart” in order to get away from the defendant. The witness testified that the defendant “was steadily going, not braking, nothing. He was just going. He was speeding.”

Published on: October 5, 2014

Court Discusses Lifetime Probation Sentence for Defendant

by Stephen Bilkis

A Nassau Criminal Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered April 3, 1979, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, on his plea of guilty, and imposing an indeterminate sentence of one year to life. By order dated August 20, 1979, this court remitted the matter to the Administrative Judge of the Nassau County Court for further proceedings with respect to his disapproval of a sentence of lifetime probation and the appeal has been held in abeyance in the interim. The Administrative Judge has complied.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, on January 22, 1979 defendant pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, a class A-III felony, in satisfaction of an indictment charging him with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fifth degrees. Pursuant to subdivision 1 (par. (b)) of section 65.00 of the Penal Law, the sentencing court forwarded a letter dated February 15, 1979 to the Administrative Judge of the Nassau County Court stating that in his opinion the ends of justice would best be served by imposing a sentence of lifetime probation on the defendant and requesting concurrence in the imposition of such a sentence. The request was denied by the Administrative Judge by crossing out the word “approved” at the foot of the letter, leaving the word “disapproved”. No reasons were stated. On April 3, 1979 the County Court imposed an indeterminate term of imprisonment of a minimum of one year and a maximum of life, the minimum sentence permissible in the absence of the concurrence of the Administrative Judge.

The issue in this case is whether defendant is entitled to probation.

Published on: September 27, 2014

Injured Police Denied Benefits

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the petitioners,WC and RR, police officers with the respondent Village commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7803 (3) to annul two determinations of the Village denying them benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c for injuries sustained while on duty. The Supreme Court granted the Village’s motion pursuant to CPLR 7804 (f) to dismiss the petition. We affirm. WC and RR failed to demonstrate that their respective injuries were incurred in the performance of special work related to the nature of heightened risks and duties to which police officers are exposed in the criminal justice process, and that such injuries are compensable under General Municipal Law § 207-c.

Scrutiny of the legislative intent underlying the enactment of General Municipal Law § 207-c, the case law interpreting the statute, and the statute’s place in the general scheme of statutory and common-law benefits afforded injured police officers, reveals that General Municipal Law § 207-c was designed to address a particular and narrow category of injuries.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that the General Municipal Law § 207-c was enacted in 1961 to extend to police officers benefits afforded firefighters since 1938 pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a. In relevant part, General Municipal Law § 207-c provides that a police officer injured in the performance of his [or her] duties or who is taken sick as a result of the performance of his [or her] duties so as to necessitate medical or other lawful remedial treatment is entitled to the full amount of his [or her] regular salary or wages until the period of disability arising therefrom has ceased, and to payment for all medical treatment and hospital care necessitated by reason of such injury or illness. Upon signing the bill into law, then-Governor Rockefeller noted that parity between police officers and firefighters was warranted because police officers, like firefighters, were exposed to substantial hazards in the performance of their duties. Indeed, it is clear that the heightened risks and duties faced by firefighters and police officers constituted the basis for the enactment of both statutes, and are factors repeatedly invoked as a basis for extending General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits to additional persons. For example, in bringing certain advanced ambulance medical technicians under the statute’s protections, it was argued that such technicians are assigned to many of the same hazardous situations and potentially life-threatening duties as police officers, and that they respond to life-threatening police assignments such as riots, hostage or barricade situations. In extending the protections of General Municipal Law § 207-c to Nassau County probation officers, the Senate observed, today’s probation officers find themselves performing many of the functions performed by their counterparts in the police and corrections services and, like other police and peace officers, probation officers are exposed on a daily basis to the risks and dangers involved in managing an increasingly violent criminal population. In sum, the Legislature’s focus in enacting and amending General Municipal Law § 207-c has been to provide benefits to persons for injuries arising from the heightened risks and duties to which they are exposed in their special work.

Published on: September 24, 2014

Defendant Claims Double Jeopardy

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the defendant was indicted by a Nassau County Grand Jury on September 23, 1985, charged with Grand Larceny, Second Degree. In the indictment, it is alleged that, on or about July 15, 1985, the defendant stole a 1984 Pontiac Trans-Am from Robert Chevrolet, an automobile dealership in Hicksville, New York.

The defendant has moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the prosecution of the indictment is barred by dint of a previous prosecution, pursuant to section 40.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law. In support of his motion, the defendant alleges the following facts: Upon information and belief, the defendant appeared on September 25, 1985 in Passaic County New Jersey Superior Court and was sentenced to four years in a correctional facility for receiving stolen property. The receiving stolen property conviction was based on the defendant’s having been arrested on July 16, 1985 in Passaic County in possession of the same 1984 Pontiac automobile that he allegedly stole in Nassau County on July 15, 1985 from Robert Chevrolet.

On August 19, 1985 the defendant was charged in a felony complaint with stealing the aforesaid Pontiac, and on September 23, 1985 he was indicted for Grand Larceny in the Third Degree in connection with that alleged theft. The People do not contest the factual allegations set forth by defense counsel, only his legal conclusions.

Published on: September 22, 2014

Defendant Claims his Right to a Speedy Trial was Violated

by Stephen Bilkis

Defendant moves by writ of habeas corpus to dismiss an indictment pending against him in this court by reason of the People’s failure to bring said indictment on for trial within a period of 180 days.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that on June 30, 1959, defendant was sentenced to Sing Sing Prison upon a judgment of conviction. Prior thereto, on January 21, 1959, and March 23, 1959, warrants had been lodged against defendant by reason of information filed charging defendant with violations of sections 1290, 1293-a and 1294 of the Penal Law. These warrants were, thereafter, lodged with the warden of Sing Sing Prison. Defendant alleges that during his incarceration in state prison he served upon the district attorney of a notice to dispose of any untried indictment, information, or complaint pending against him. The district attorney acknowledges receipt of such notice on or about October 21, 1959.

On November 17, 1959, the prior information heretofore filed against defendant were superseded by an indictment charging defendant with the crime of grand larceny in the first degree, two counts, and on May 20, 1960, this court entered an order directing that the defendant be delivered to Nassau County for arraignment. Thereafter, on May 31, 1960, defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment and the court appointed counsel to represent him.

Published on: September 15, 2014

Defendant Brings am Application for Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Criminal Lawyer said this is a motion by defendant for an order granting his application for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal. This motion requires the Court to decide whether a prosecutor, once having determined to consent to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, conditions that consent upon the defendant’s release of his civil claim against the County and certain of its police officers.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that the defendant was charged with Obstructing Governmental Administration, and Resisting Arrest. The defendant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on October 15, 1973. On November 15, 1973, a pre-trial conference was held and the question of adjournment in contemplation of dismissal was discussed without any final disposition reached. The matter came before this Court in the trial part on March 12, 1974, and adjourned for trial to March 14, 1974.

On December 20, 1973, a notice of claim by the defendant was served upon the County of Nassau for damages arising out of the subject matter of the herein criminal charges brought against the defendant.

Published on: July 24, 2014

Court Discusses Issues Involving Undercover Narcotic Sales

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, in May of this year, members of the Brooklyn Tactical Narcotics Teams arrested the defendants for street level narcotics sales to undercover police officers. In each case, both the arrest and the overt conduct constituting the crimes charged [PL §§ 220.39(1) and 220.16(1) ] occurred entirely within Kings County. “Pursuant to an agreement between the District Attorney of Kings County and the Special Narcotics Prosecutor for the City of New York”, these criminal actions were commenced by the filing of felony complaints in New York County Criminal Court. The People did not obtain transfer orders from the supreme court pursuant to Judiciary Law § 177-b(2).

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, all three defendants were arraigned in New York County, and their cases adjourned to Part N, New York County, for action by the special narcotics grand jury and/or possible disposition by way of waiver of indictment and the filing of a superior court information. When each defendant initially appeared in Part N the People had no grand jury action to report. Counsel orally moved before this court for dismissal of the felony complaints on the ground that the court lacked geographical jurisdiction as defined in CPL § 20.40. With the concurrence of all the parties, the court reserved decision and set a schedule for the filing of written motions and memoranda of law.

The issue is whether article 5-B of the Judiciary Law, which established special narcotics parts of the Supreme Court, or any other provision of law, confers jurisdiction on this court over felony complaints alleging overt criminal conduct wholly occurring in another county.

Published on: July 20, 2014

Court Decides Case Regarding Workers Comp Dispute

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, this is an appeal (1) from a decision and an amended decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed April 6, 1989 and December 13, 1989, which ruled that claimant sustained an accidental injury in the course of his employment, and (2) from a decision of said Board, filed May 31, 1990, which denied the application by the workers’ compensation insurance carrier for reopening and reconsideration.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, on January 29, 1987 claimant, a court officer employed by the New York City Criminal Court, sustained an injury to his right ankle. The facts leading up to this event are as follows. On the day in question claimant was to take leave from work for jury duty. While claimant had not been selected as a juror at that point, he was still in the jury pool. Coincidentally, claimant’s assigned work location at Queens Criminal Court is next to the building where he was to report for jury duty. Claimant testified that on that morning he went into his employer’s office and entered “J.D.” (for jury duty) in the log book. Claimant testified that he had to make such an entry so that the employer would not mistakenly charge the time missed against his sick leave reserves. After signing the log book, claimant left his workplace and went over to the jury room and checked in. Subsequently, claimant left the building to get a book from his car. As claimant began to walk back toward the building to return to the jury room, he slipped on some ice and sustained the subject injury. Claimant received treatment at the hospital for his injury that day and he returned to work February 3, 1987.

Thereafter, the employer reported the injury to the Workers’ Compensation Board. In August 1987 the employer controverted claimant’s right to workers’ compensation benefits. A preliminary hearing was held before a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge in November 1987 after which the claim was disallowed. Claimant appealed to a Workers’ Compensation Board and, ultimately, the decision was reversed based on the Board’s conclusion that claimant had sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. An application to the Board to reconsider its amended decision was denied. The employer now appeals from all decisions issued by the Board.

Published on: July 16, 2014

Defendant Claims Case is Nonjusticiable

by Stephen Bilkis

A New York Criminal Lawyer said this appeal results from dispositions of defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the action as nonjusticiable. Supreme Court denied the motion, but in the decision and order now before us the sought relief was granted by the Appellate Division. That court held that there was no cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel other than one seeking postconviction relief, and, relatedly, that violation of a criminal defendant’s right to counsel could not be vindicated in a collateral civil proceeding, particularly where the object of the collateral action was to compel an additional allocation of public resources, which the court found to be a properly legislative prerogative. Plaintiffs have appealed as of right from the Appellate Division’s order pursuant to CPLR 5601(a) and (b)(1).

A New York Criminal lawyer said that 10 out of the 20 plaintiffs-two from Washington, two from Onondaga, two from Ontario and four from Schuyler County-were altogether without representation at the arraignments held in their underlying criminal proceedings. Eight of these unrepresented plaintiffs were jailed after bail had been set in amounts they could not afford. It is alleged that the experience of these plaintiffs is illustrative of what is a fairly common practice in the aforementioned counties of arraigning defendants without counsel and leaving them, particularly when accused of relatively low level offenses, unrepresented in subsequent proceedings where pleas are taken and other critically important legal transactions take place. One of these plaintiffs remained unrepresented for some five months and it is alleged that the absence of clear and uniform guidelines reasonably related to need has commonly resulted in denials of representation to indigent defendants based on the subjective judgments of individual jurists.

In addition to the foregoing allegations of outright nonrepresentation, the complaint contains allegations to the effect that although lawyers were eventually nominally appointed for plaintiffs, they were unavailable to their clients-that they conferred with them little, if at all, were often completely unresponsive to their urgent inquiries and requests from jail, sometimes for months on end, waived important rights without consulting them, and ultimately appeared to do little more on their behalf than act as conduits for plea offers, some of which purportedly were highly unfavorable. It is repeatedly alleged that counsel missed court appearances, and that when they did appear they were not prepared to proceed, often because they were entirely new to the case, the matters having previously been handled by other similarly unprepared counsel.1 There are also allegations that the counsel appointed for at least one of the plaintiffs was seriously conflicted and thus unqualified to undertake the representation.