Articles Posted in Robbery

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In the late evening on the 24th of October, the defendant along with another individual accosted and robbed a victim as she was walking along a street in Manhattan. The defendant displayed what looked like a handgun, but was just a toy pistol. The other individual had a knife.

The defendant and the other individual were arrested and by way of a four count indictment were charged with first degree robbery, two counts of second degree robbery, and first degree criminal use of a firearm.

The defendant was found guilty after a jury trial was held. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of three to nine years for each of the four convictions. The convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Appellate Court.

Case Discussion and Decision
The main issue in this case is whether the first degree robbery charge is appropriate to support the conviction for first degree criminal use of a firearm. The court finds that it is appropriate and is confirming the decision made by the Supreme Court and Appellate Court.

The defendant is appealing a sentence made in the Supreme Court in Kings County. The sentence convicted the defendant of sexual abuse in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty and the sentence is an indeterminate term of one and one half to three years imprisonment as a second felony offender.

Court Discussion
The defendant was improperly adjudicated a second felony offender because the elements of the offense that served as the predicate for this adjudication did not constitute a felony in New York. The prior conviction was for unlawful possession of a weapon in the third degree which violates the New Jersey code of criminal justice. The defendant was incarcerated for four years for that conviction.

Court Decision
It is determined that the defendant was incorrectly sentenced as a second felony offender. For this reason, the sentence is modified on the law by vacating the defendant’s adjudication as second felony offender and reducing his sentence to an indeterminate term of one to three years imprisonment. The rest of the sentence is affirmed.
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This is an appeal from a judgment made by the County Court of Albany County. The defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery in the second degree.

Case Background
The criminal defendant was convicted after a jury trial for participating in an armed robbery of two individuals who were in a car in the city of Albany. As one of the individuals was getting out of the car a man carrying a gun approached the driver’s side door of the car and pointed a gun at his head and demanded money. The victim turned over money, jewelry, and his cell phone.

A second gunman, who the People identify as the defendant, approached the passenger side of the car and demanded that the passenger empty his pockets, which he did. The victims were then forced out of the car, and told to lie on the ground. The defendant and his partner searched through the car. During this time both of the victims were hit in the head with the guns. Assault could have been charged.

The gun men left and one of the victims found a prepaid cell phone lying on the ground by the vehicle. This was later determined to belong to the defendant.

Not long after the incident, while the victims were reporting the incident to the police and turning over the cell phone that they had found, a call came in to the defendant’s phone from the cell phone that had been stolen during the robbery.

The victim answered the phone and arranged to switch cell phones with the caller, but the caller did not show up at the arranged meeting place. During the incident the gunmen wore bandanas over their faces and the victims could not identify them. However, the victims described the height and clothing of the second gunman. The defendant’s accomplice was not apprehended.

A police officer was told to go to the home of the defendant’s parents in Albany. At around seven thirty in the morning the officer saw the defendant get out of a taxi. When the defendant saw the police car he immediately fled.

The police talked to his parents and they eventually brought him in for questioning. The defendant first stated that he was at his sister’s during the incident, but the sister denied this when she was called. The defendant then confessed to participating in the robbery.

Court Discussion and Decision
The defendant argues that his sentence is excessive. However, even though the defendant is only seventeen years old and has a lack of violent history, the court does not find that the sentence was unduly harsh or excessive. The sentence was a lot less than the maximum authorized sentence and given the active role of the defendant in the incident, the sentence is fair.

The previous judgment and sentence is affirmed.
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The criminal defendant man was indicted for the crimes of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree and grand larceny in the second degree. On August 10, 1978 the defendant moved for a dismissal of the indictment on the ground that he was not given an opportunity to testify before the grand jury, although timely notice to that effect was served upon the district attorney. On August 25, 1978 the accused man’s motion was heard. The complainant conceded that the defendant man was not notified to appear as a witness before the grand jury, but would not consent to a dismissal on that ground. The complainant moved that, instead, the indictment be dismissed in the interests of justice. The defendant joined in the complainant’s motion and the indictment was dismissed on that ground.

Thereafter, on August 28, 1978, the complainant’s instant application for leave to resubmit was argued. The complainant alleged that through inadvertence, leave to submit the charges to another grand jury and to make the dismissal conditional upon the defendant testifying under a waiver of immunity was not requested. Credit card fraud was not involved.

The defendant man contends that since the indictment was dismissed in the interests of justice on the complainant’s own motion, the court is without the authority to grant leave at this time. Furthermore, he argues that an application for leave to resubmit the charges after dismissal of an indictment may be made only at the time the motion to dismiss was heard and granted. Since the complainant failed to ask for leave to submit the charges at that time whether inadvertently or otherwise, they are estopped from seeking that relief. The complainant on the other hand urged that upon all of the attendant circumstances the court may properly grant the application, although such relief was not applied for upon the dismissal of the indictment. Bribery was not involved.

The law is clear that a grand jury proceeding is defective when the defendant is not accorded an opportunity to appear and to testify before the grand jury in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL). A defendant has a right to appear before the grand jury hearing if the charges of which is he is accused, upon the service of a notice of request to the district attorney and execution of a waiver of immunity. Upon receiving such notice, the district attorney must notify the grand jury foreman and serve the defendant with a notice of the date he is to appear. If the defendant is not accorded of his right to appear and to testify before the grand jury, the proceedings are defective and the indictment should be dismissed. An indictment may also be dismissed in the interests of justice. A motion to dismiss on this ground may be brought by the complainant, by the court or by the defendant.

The fact that the indictment was dismissed in the interests of justice rather than because of defective grand jury proceedings is immaterial. Criminal Procedure Law permits resubmission of charges on both grounds.

The intent of the Legislature was to permit a resubmission of the charges under court order upon dismissal in those cases where the defect should not result in foreclosure of further prosecution, but prohibits resubmission where the impediment is of an inherently fatal nature. It is obvious that the Legislature did not deem a defective grand jury proceeding as an impediment of an inherently fatal nature. In those cases where a defendant has immunity; or the prosecution is barred by reason of a prohibition against prosecution; or the prosecution is untimely; or the defendant has been denied a speedy trial, the court may not grant leave to resubmit the charges upon the dismissal of an indictment. The statute permits a resubmission where the dismissal was based upon a defective grand jury proceeding or in the interests of justice, so that further prosecution would not be foreclosed.

The defendant raises another issue which appears to be of first impression in the State of New York. He contends that CPL permits the court to authorize resubmission of a case when the application to do so is made by the complainant upon the dismissal of an indictment. He claims that the word “upon” as used in the statute means the precise moment the indictment is dismissed. Therefore, since the application in the case was made three days later, the court should not grant the relief sought in the proceeding.

Research revealed one case that discussed the word “upon” as a point of time. The court, applying the dictionary definition of “upon” as “with little or no interval after” (Webster’s New International Dictionary, 1950), held that these delays invalidated the seizures. It stated that a delay of a period of days or short weeks at most would be permissible under the statute. Although the court did not resolve the question of how long a delay might not be too long, it held that the delays in that case were too long.

Two cases relied on by the complainant appear to sustain their position that the failure to apply for leave to resubmit at the time the indictment was dismissed does not bar an application for that relief thereafter. In one of the two cases, the court stated that after the County Court dismissed an indictment following the granting of a motion to suppress physical evidence upon which the indictment was based, the available remedies to the complainant for possible reinstatement of the indictment was either by appeal under the then section 518 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or by applying to the County Court under the then section 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for leave to resubmit the matter to the same or another grand jury. The complainant was granted leave to apply to the County Court to submit the charges to another grand jury.

In the second case, the court held that the dismissal of the indictment without the authorization to submit or resubmit the charges to the same or another grand jury barred further prosecution of the charges. However, the court pointed out the fact that the dismissals did not grant the complainant the authorization to resubmit the charges to a Kings County Grand Jury does not bar them from seeking such authorization.

The indictment in the instant case was dismissed on August 25, 1978 and the complainant brought this proceeding by way of order to show cause on August 28, 1978, a delay of three days. The statute, it will be recalled, used the word “upon dismissal”. It does not state contemporaneously with or immediately upon. A delay of three days was but a short interval of time and within the meaning of Criminal Procedure Law. The delay was not so inordinately long as to violate the mandate of the statute that leave be sought upon dismissal. The application for leave to submit the charges to another grand jury (the grand jury which found the instant indictment is no longer in session) is granted. However, that aspect of the application which seeks to amend the order of dismissal so as to make it conditional upon the defendant appearing and testifying as a witness after waiving immunity is denied.
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A man was indicted on two counts of robbery in the second degree. But, he pleads not guilty to both indictments, with a reason of insanity and he was thereafter sent to the hospital for observation. The hospital reported that he was unable to understand the nature of the criminal charges and to make a defense. The court then transported him to the state hospital. Later, the man was pronounced recovered by the state hospital, but at the court’s direction he was sent to another hospital for re-examination. The hospital reported that he was still unable to understand the nature of the charges and to make a defense. The man was again committed to another state hospital. Consequently, the man appeared in county court contending that he was capable to stand on trial for his charges.

After a hearing, he was remanded to the state hospital for further treatment. Thirteen days later, the man escaped from the hospital and was at large. He was thereafter indicted for the crimes of kidnapping, robbery in the first degree, grand larceny in the first degree and assault in the second degree. The court then committed the man to the psychiatric division which reported that the man was normal, and was capable of understanding the charges against him and of making his defense.

At a hearing, the man’s attorney offered no objection to the report and it was appropriately confirmed by the court.

Prior to accepting the plea of guilty, the court questioned the man to determine if he understood the meaning and significance of the plea.

At all time the man was represented by an attorney. The man also filed to vacate the decision of conviction and hearings on the motion were held. Subsequently, the man was transferred to the hospital returning to prison. The court then denied the man’s application.

The court stated that on the basis of the hearing and upon all of the records of the court and psychiatric reports, the court found that the man was not insane on the date of the commission of the crime. The court also found that the man was not insane and was fully capable of understanding the nature of the charge against him and making his defense. The court also found that the man has not been deprived of due process.

The man’s basic contention is that his conviction was improper because he was insane when he committed the crime for which he was convicted. He asserts that the court should have called the superintendent of the state hospital to establish the aforementioned fact.

The court stated that the psychiatric examination and the hearing were for the sole purpose of determining the man’s ability at the time of trial to understand the nature of the charges against him and to make his defense.

Sources revealed that there was complete compliance with the code of criminal procedure. In addition, if the man wished to call the superintendent of state hospital to disprove the report of the psychiatrist, it was his right but the court observes no such obligation on the part of the court. Instead he made no objection and the report was confirmed by the court with his consent.

Apparently, there was no question raised as to the man’s sanity at the time of his plea. The merits have been passed on twice and denied. In addition, it is apparent that the trial court had authority of the man and of the crimes, with which he was charged, and he is detained pursuant to the decision. Since the man’s term has not expired, it is not available to him.
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The defendant is appealing a judgment made by the County Court of Nassau County. The judgment convicted him of robbery in the third degree.

Case Background
The defendant was charged with robbery in the first degree for having forcibly stolen money from the complainant’s store while wielding a knife. The complainant testified that the defendant had taken money from both the cash register and a cigar box in which lottery receipts were kept and warned her not to tell anyone about the robbery.

The defendant testified on his own behalf and admitted that he had stolen money from the cigar box, but denied having a knife as well as stealing money from the register and threatening the complainant.

Before the trial, the defendant made a motion to limit the prosecutions crosses examination regarding his prior criminal convictions. The defendant had been convicted three times in the past, twice for felonies and once for a misdemeanor. The most recent charges involved a gunpoint robbery of a deli.

The trial court ruled that if the defendant took the stand that the prosecution would not be able to cross examine him about his two of his previous convictions, but would be allowed to confront the defendant with the fact that he had been previously convicted of a robbery.

After the jury was selected the court revised its ruling at the defendant’s request to limit the People’s inquiry to whether the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony without specifying that the felony was a robbery.

When the defendant testified the prosecutor abided by the ruling and the defendant admitted to being previously convicted of a felony.

Court Discussion and Decision
When a criminal defendant chooses to testify like any other civil or criminal witness they may be cross examined regarding prior crimes and bad acts that bear on credibility, veracity, or honesty.

However, in order to minimize the risk of the evidence of prior convictions will be used by the fact finder not on the issue of credibility, but as proof of the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged crime, the defendant may obtain from the court an advance ruling as to whether and to what extent the people will be allowed to offer the evidence in the event the defendant testifies.

The court has reviewed the facts of the case and finds that the People followed the court order while cross examining the defendant.

For this reason, the motion by the defendant is denied as the issue did not affect the outcome of the jury trial.
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The defendant was charged by indictment with the crimes of robbery in the first and second degrees based on his participation in the holdup of a convenience store located in the city of Albany. Two of his accomplices pleaded guilty to the robbery and testified against the defendant.

A jury trial was held and the defendant was found guilty as charged and later sentenced as a predicate felony offender to an aggregate prison term of seventeen and a half years. The defendant is appealing the verdict and his subsequent sentence.

Case Discussion
The defendant claims that the statements that he made to the officer’s after he was arrested should have been suppressed because they were in violation of his indelible right to counsel. The defendant contends that the law circumvented that right by arresting him without a warrant when in fact; the police did have sufficient information to obtain a warrant before his arrest.

In this particular case, the defendant was not arrested in his home, but rather spotted on the streets of Albany and when he was approached by the police, who had information that he had been involved in a robbery, the defendant ran from them. The defendant was then arrested in a nearby building.

It is established that if a defendant is discovered out in the open, as the defendant was, the police are at liberty to refrain from securing an arrest warrant in order to question the defendant in the absence of counsel.

The defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction is found to be without merit as well.

In this case the People satisfied the proof and burden requirements on all of the elements and therefore established a prima facie case from which a rational jury could conclude that the defendant committed the crimes that he was charged with.

During the trial, two individuals testified that they acted as lookouts and saw the defendant and another individual enter the convenience store with a handgun, hit the attendant in the head with the gun and then take all the cash from the register. The four individuals split the money and went their separate ways.

Case Decision
The court has reviewed the case and has determined that the Supreme Court did not make an error when they rejected the defendant’s request for a missing witness charge. The other arguments that are made by the defendant in regard to his case are also found to be without merit.

The verdict made in the original court is now affirmed and the charges and the sentencing of the defendant will stand.
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On October 11, 1994, the defendant is accused of having burglarized a person and forcibly stolen their wallet, a checkbook, and a car. On October 12 and 13, 1994, he is charged with forging and cashing two of the stolen checks. After a jury trial, he was convicted of eight of the 17 offenses that he was originally charged with. He was sentenced to 5 ½ to 16 ½ years of prison. He filed an appeal. His contention was that his trial counsel denied him effective assistance.

The situation that he referred to occurred during pretrial hearings of his case. His public defender was given the witness list. He recognized one of the names on the list as a woman who had previously been represented by his office. He pulled her file and discovered confidential information relating to her substance abuse problem and treatment. He immediately notified the county court that he had a conflict in representing the defendant because he felt that effective counsel would use this information to impeach the witness. He felt that the information was relevant to the credibility of the witness and should be used in cross-examination of her on the stand. However, he was not allowed to use the information because it was attorney client privilege that he would not have if his office had not defended her. The defendant stated repeatedly that he wanted the court to allow that information to be heard. He continued to demand it even after the court had advised him that the information could not be used to impeach the witness under the Mental Hygiene Law § 23.05.

The witness was produced and came with her own counsel to court. She advised that she was waiving her right to confidentiality with respect to any of the information in her file at the Public Defender’s office. She specifically agreed to allow the defense to raise questions concerning her prior drug use and criminal charges. Since she had agreed to allow the information to be raised and was questioned in reference to it, neither the defendant or the defense attorney had any more objections to the defense attorney continuing to act as council for the defendant.

The defendant claims that the defense attorney was not asked if he wanted to continue representing him after his disclosure of the “conflict of interest.” He contends that the court failed to ask him if he still wanted to be defended by that particular public defender. He presented his concern that the public defender was affected by his office’s previous representation of the witness. He stated his concerns that the public defender must have felt divided loyalties while cross-examining the witness. He fears that these divided loyalties may have undermined his defense. The court rejects these theories.

The court points out that the defendant was able to impeach the witness on information that under any other circumstances, he would not have been allowed to use. If he had any other attorney, that information would not have been divulged in court. That testimony only served to bolster the defense case. Even though he was not specifically asked if he still wanted that public defender, the defender did a good job.

The defendant also contended that his sentence was too harsh given the circumstances. The court states that the aggregate sentence is not harsh or excessive. They point out that it is within the statutory range for the crimes that the defendant was convicted of committing. The Supreme Court stated that the “Determination of an appropriate sentence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reduced in the absence of extraordinary circumstances or a clear abuse of discretion.” People v. Wright, 214 A.D. 2d 759, 762, 624 N.Y. S. 2d 650.
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A man was charged with robbery in the second degree as an armed and violent Class C felony. He pled guilty to a Class D violent felony offense in exchange for a prison sentence of one to three years. At that time, the court agreed to consider an application for a less sentence based on mitigating circumstances. The court later found that there was insufficient mitigating evidence to support a shorter term than he had already received. He then challenged the court’s decision, alleging a violation of his due process rights. The court rejected his claim. At the sentencing hearing, his criminal defense attorney filed another application for a shorter sentence, which was also denied.

The case was then referred to the Supreme Court Appellate Division to address defendant’s constitutional claim. After reviewing New York Penal Law, the court determined that the prison term he received was appropriate and that the lower acted within the boundaries of its discretion in handing down the sentence. Accordingly, his plea arrangement and sentence were affirmed.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Lupiano noted that the statute in question, Penal Law Section 70.02., was in fact constitutional. Furthermore, the judge noted that in pleading guilty to the second degree attempted robbery charge, defendant was fully aware of the sentencing restrictions imposed by law.

The judge went on to cite a Colorado case, Specht v. Patterson, in which a defendant was convicted for indecent liberties with a minor. Instead of being sentenced under the statutory guidelines, another man was sentenced under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, which allows an indeterminate sentence ranging from one day to life in prison. In that case, the use of the Sex Offenders Act entailed the creation of a new charge which would have required Mr. Specht’s due process rights to be observed.

In the first case, a new charge was not the issue. The question centered on the plea bargain arrangement and the statutory sentencing guidelines that govern it. Under Statute 70.02, the sentencing court was permitted to impose the same sentence on an individual who pleads guilty to a class D violent felony as it would for someone who was convicted by a jury of the same offense. Accordingly, Justice Lupiano concluded that the conviction for second degree robbery and his sentence should be affirmed.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sullivan held that the sentencing court made no attempt to justify the sentence it imposed and that the sentence was outside the scope of its discretion. The judge found that in sentencing him, the court did not take into account mitigating circumstances surrounding his background and lifestyle since committing the crimes. The judge also argued that Penal Law Section 70.02 was unconstitutional because it allowed defendants to be sentenced to an enhanced punishment for an unproven charge without requiring the prosecution to show evidence of the crimes. This effectively equates to a violation of a defendant’s due process rights. Accordingly, Justice Sullivan held that Mr. Felix’s sentence should be reversed and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

While the majority determined that the sentence should be upheld, his criminal defense attorney was able to persuade at least one member of the appellate panel that the sentencing was unfairly imposed. Defendant was fortunate to have such a dedicated legal advocate fighting for his rights.
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Two men were indicted on January 28, 1977, for murder in the second degree and attempted robbery in the first degree. A woman was also indicted for the same counts but pled guilty to attempted robbery and testified for the prosecution at trial. According to court documents, the three and another man attempted to rob another in his home. During the attempted robbery, the owner was shot in the head. He died a few days after the incident. Had his home been unoccupied at the time the four individuals broke into his home with the intent to steal, his life might have been spared and the defendants may only have been charged with burglary.

Three weeks after the robbery occurred, one of the robbers was arrested and given a Miranda warning. He then made a statement to police in writing, which he signed. A second written statement was later given to an assistant district attorney. In these two statements, he claimed that he and his partner had developed a plan to make money, which involved the robbery of the house. The two men met with another before going to the woman’s home to further discuss the robbery. They forced their way into the apartment. One pointed a gun at the owner but stated he had never intended to harm him. A struggle ensued and the gun went off, causing the injuries to the owner. Both theives then left the scene.

One robber was arrested approximately two weeks later and after being read his rights, gave a statement to police. In the statement, which he refused to sign, he detailed his involvement in the robbery and the events prior. Smalls stated that he was with the other two men on the night the robbery occurred and that he went with them to the woman’s apartment. Essentially, he stated that he was present during the planning of the robbery and the crime itself but that he never had any intent to participate in the event.

His attorney filed a pretrial motion to sever his case from his partner but that motion was denied. The court suppressed his pretrial statements but allowed his partner’s pretrial statements to be admitted into evidence. He then renewed his original motion to sever, citing his partner’s pretrial statements as prejudicial to his case. The court denied this motion and certain portions of his statements were redacted but references were still made to his knowledge that the robbery was going to occur.

At trial, the testimony of Mary was considered key to the case. She described one as actively participating in the robbery while the second’s role in the crime was minimized. She also testified that she was not present at the robbery or the shooting but that one had told her about it afterward. The man made further statements that suggested that he had acted deliberately in shooting Mr. Pratt.

A friend of the owner testified that three men had approached him in the hallway of the apartment building where the robbery occurred and that each of them were armed with guns. He stated that one of the men had placed a gun to his head while the others forcibly entered the apartment. The friend was forced into the bathroom and later heard a gunshot. When asked to identify the gunmen in court, he stated that one of the prisoners looked like the man who had forced him into the bathroom.

The owner’s mother and brother, who were present during the robbery and shooting, were unable to identify either of the robbers as the man who had shot the victim. All of the witnesses present at the time of the shooting testified that the men continued to demand money after the owner was shot. Both subsequently convicted of felony murder and their convictions were affirmed by the Appellate Division. The two men then filed separate appeals with the New York Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals was charged with determining whether the trial court committed an error in allowing McGee’s confession to be admitted into evidence and in charging the jury with regard to the presumption of intent. The court held that the admission of the confession and the fact that one was not available to be cross-examined deprived Mr. Smalls of the right to confront the witnesses against him.

The court also went on to say that the trial court erred in charging the jury regarding the intent to commit a crime. The judge essentially told the jury that a person is presumed to intend what he or she does and the consequences of those acts. In one’s case, the court held that there was no error since the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In the other’s case, the court held that the charge was harmful to the outcome of his case. Consequently, the court opted to reverse one’s conviction and ordered a new trial. The other’s conviction was upheld and the other arguments presented in his appeal denied.
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Two separate robberies occurred in parking garages on the East Side of Manhattan in August of 1982. On August 17, A and two other individuals stole two cars after threatening the parking attendant with a gun. A few days later on August 20, 1982, B, who had participated in the first robbery, picked A up from his mother’s home. Another robbery occurred in a different parking garage and Colon and Tisdale were later seen showing off one of the four cars that were stolen to other people in the neighborhood. The parking attendant who worked at the second garage was found dead on the floor of the garage office. He had been killed with a shotgun and fingerprint evidence suggested that B but not A had been present in the office. Despite this evidence, Mr. A was convicted of second degree murder and first, second and third degree robbery. He was sentenced as a violent offender and received 15 years to life for the murder, 6 to 12 years each for the first and second degree robbery counts and 3 to 6 years for the third degree robbery count. The judge ordered the sentences to run concurrently with one another but consecutively with another sentence of 12 ½ to 25 years for an unrelated conviction.

Mr. A appealed his conviction on the grounds that the trial court committed an error in denying his motion to vacate the judgment based on insufficient evidence. The Supreme Court Appellate Division, first Department was charged with determining whether his appeal had any merit.

At trial, one of the individuals who participated in the first robbery provided testimony concerning the planning of the crime and its actual execution. This witness stated that Mr. A had used a gun during the robbery and that he had kept one of the stolen cars for himself. Two more witnesses also testified that Mr. A was seen driving the car following the robbery. Mr. A was attempting to enter this same vehicle at the time he was arrested and his fingerprints were found inside the car. The court held that this evidence, along with the testimony of the witnesses, was sufficient to prove the elements of the crime of robbery in the third degree. Under New York law, robbery involves the taking of another person’s property through the use of force or threat. Other types of crimes involving the theft of property, such as larceny or burglary, typically do not involve the use of force.

Mr. A’s attorney also argued that the prosecutor’s opening statements and the admission of photographs of the deceased victim into evidence were prejudicial to the case. Additionally, Mr. A claimed that the prosecutor’s questioning of a witness on redirect was outside the boundaries of what should have been allowed. The defense also raised an issue over the court’s decision to allow the sentences for murder and robbery to run consecutively with the other unrelated sentence.

The court opted to deny Mr. A’s arguments and accordingly, his conviction was upheld.
In the state of New York, robbery is a felony offense and conviction for this or a similar property crime can lead to life-altering consequences.
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