Articles Posted in Queens

Published on:

From the records, in a Criminal Court Complaint, the People assert that a Police Officer observed the offenders at the Subway station. The officer allegedly watched the offenders “acting in concert” receive United States currency from four individuals, “in exchange for which the offenders swiped a Metrocard through the subway turnstile for each of these individuals, thereby allowing the said individuals to enter the transit system.”

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the offenders were charged with Petit Larceny, five counts of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Third Degree, and Obstructing Governmental Administration in the Second Degree, all Class A misdemeanors. By motion, one of the offenders seeks the dismissal of all charges contained in the Criminal Court Complaint, asserting that the People’s complaint is facially insufficient and pursuant to CPL Sec. 170.35, 100.40 and 100.15, asserting that the People’s complaint is facially insufficient.

Their motions were granted in part, and denied in part for the reasons stated below:

Published on:

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, this is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered September 16, 2008, convicting him of murder in the second degree, vehicular manslaughter in the first degree, aggravated driving while intoxicated (DWI), operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, at around midnight on October 18 to 19, 2007, the defendant went to the Island Rock nightclub in Hempstead with his girlfriend, a friend of his girlfriend, and another individual. After drinking alcohol at the nightclub, the defendant and the other individual left and went to a nearby parking lot. The friend of the defendant’s girlfriend testified that the defendant did not appear intoxicated at that time. According to him, the defendant stated in the parking lot “I lost my shit,” presumably referring to drugs, and the defendant became upset. The defendant went into the trunk of his car and searched for something. The defendant then began arguing with his girlfriend. At approximately 3:15 A.M., several witnesses heard gunshots, but no one reported having seen the defendant fire a gun. The defendant then angrily ordered said friend to leave with his girlfriend, which he did, driving the defendant’s girlfriend home. The defendant and the other individual then entered the defendant’s vehicle, with the defendant driving. When police officers arrived at the parking lot only minutes later, at about 3:20 A.M., the defendant had left, and the officers recovered several 9-millimeter shell casings in the parking lot.

A Queens Criminal Lawyer said that, thereafter, at approximately 3:30 A.M., the defendant’s vehicle was seen traveling west in the eastbound lanes of the Southern State Parkway at a speed of 70 to 75 miles per hour. According to numerous witnesses, the defendant’s vehicle traveled in the wrong direction from about exit 19 to exit 13, a distance of approximately five miles. A witness observed the defendant driving directly at him while changing lanes. That witness had to immediately pull his vehicle onto the shoulder to avoid a collision. This witness saw that the defendant continued driving the wrong way, and the witness observed the other vehicles on the parkway “split apart” in order to get away from the defendant. The witness testified that the defendant “was steadily going, not braking, nothing. He was just going. He was speeding.”

Published on:

A New York Criminal Lawyer said this is an application, pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act, for an order prohibiting the District Court of Nassau County and the judges thereof from taking any further steps or action in connection with a prosecution of the petitioner except as a youthful offender.

A Nassau DWI Lawyer said that, on October 2, 1958, petitioner was charged, in the District Court of Nassau County, with a violation of § 20, sub. 4 and § 11, sub. 1 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law of the State of New York, each being misdemeanors. He was then eighteen (18) years of age. Upon arraignment he applied for youthful offender treatment. The District Attorney recommended that petitioner be investigated for the purpose of determining whether he was eligible to be adjudged a youthful offender. The petitioner signed the necessary consent required by § 913-g, sub. 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure whereupon the judge then presiding ordered an investigation to be made by the Probation Department of Nassau County to assist him to determine whether petitioner was eligible to be adjudged a youthful offender. The Probation Department, because of its great volume of work with more pressing and serious cases, said it could not make the investigation requested and remitted the matter to the District Court. Because he had no probation report before him, the judge then presiding denied petitioner youthful offender treatment and ordered the case tried in the Traffic Part of the District Court rather than the Youth Part. Immediately following this ruling, and prior to trial, petitioner appealed therefrom to the County Court of Nassau County. That court dismissed the appeal as being one from an intermediate order and therefore not appealable.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, petitioner now seeks this remedy contending that the action of the District Court has unjustly deprived him of a right and the protection afforded him under Title VII-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Proceedings Respecting Youthful Offenders).

Published on:

A New York Criminal Lawyer asks if a vial of blood taken from a defendant, in the course of treatment and diagnosis following an automobile accident, be later obtained and tested by the People and the results used in prosecuting that defendant for driving while intoxicated and other charges? For the reasons set forth below, both the blood and the blood test results are protected by the physician-patient privilege and are precluded from use at the trial in this case.

The defendant is charged with violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) (driving while intoxicated), Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212 (reckless driving), Penal Law § 120.20 (reckless endangerment in the second degree) and Penal Law § 145.00 (3) (criminal mischief in the fourth degree).

The defendant moves for various forms of relief: 1. Dismissal of the charges of: (A) reckless driving (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212); (B) criminal mischief in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 145.00 [3]); and (C) reckless endangerment in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.20) on the grounds that said charges are insufficient and defective, pursuant to CPL 170.30, 170.35, 100.15 and 100.40. 2. An order, pursuant to CPL 710.20, suppressing evidence of any chemical test of the defendant’s blood upon the grounds that the search warrant was based upon less than probable cause. 3. Preclusion of the evidence of any chemical test of the defendant’s blood upon the grounds that: (A) the search warrant abrogated the defendant’s rights pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 (3); (B) the defendant’s blood was taken in violation of the physician-patient privilege; (C) the blood test results are unreliable as a matter of law; and (D) the People cannot establish a chain of custody for the blood test results. 4. Preclusion of the data results of the powertrain control module obtained from the defendant’s automobile on the basis that said results are scientifically unreliable or, in the alternative, the defendant seeks a Frye hearing. 5. Suppression, pursuant to CPL 710.20 (3), of the defendant’s alleged statements or, in the alternative, a Huntley hearing. 6. A Sandoval hearing. 7. An order, pursuant to CPL 200.95, for a court-ordered bill of particulars and pursuant to CPL 240.40 for court-ordered discovery.

Published on:

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the petitioners,WC and RR, police officers with the respondent Village commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7803 (3) to annul two determinations of the Village denying them benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c for injuries sustained while on duty. The Supreme Court granted the Village’s motion pursuant to CPLR 7804 (f) to dismiss the petition. We affirm. WC and RR failed to demonstrate that their respective injuries were incurred in the performance of special work related to the nature of heightened risks and duties to which police officers are exposed in the criminal justice process, and that such injuries are compensable under General Municipal Law § 207-c.

Scrutiny of the legislative intent underlying the enactment of General Municipal Law § 207-c, the case law interpreting the statute, and the statute’s place in the general scheme of statutory and common-law benefits afforded injured police officers, reveals that General Municipal Law § 207-c was designed to address a particular and narrow category of injuries.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that the General Municipal Law § 207-c was enacted in 1961 to extend to police officers benefits afforded firefighters since 1938 pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a. In relevant part, General Municipal Law § 207-c provides that a police officer injured in the performance of his [or her] duties or who is taken sick as a result of the performance of his [or her] duties so as to necessitate medical or other lawful remedial treatment is entitled to the full amount of his [or her] regular salary or wages until the period of disability arising therefrom has ceased, and to payment for all medical treatment and hospital care necessitated by reason of such injury or illness. Upon signing the bill into law, then-Governor Rockefeller noted that parity between police officers and firefighters was warranted because police officers, like firefighters, were exposed to substantial hazards in the performance of their duties. Indeed, it is clear that the heightened risks and duties faced by firefighters and police officers constituted the basis for the enactment of both statutes, and are factors repeatedly invoked as a basis for extending General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits to additional persons. For example, in bringing certain advanced ambulance medical technicians under the statute’s protections, it was argued that such technicians are assigned to many of the same hazardous situations and potentially life-threatening duties as police officers, and that they respond to life-threatening police assignments such as riots, hostage or barricade situations. In extending the protections of General Municipal Law § 207-c to Nassau County probation officers, the Senate observed, today’s probation officers find themselves performing many of the functions performed by their counterparts in the police and corrections services and, like other police and peace officers, probation officers are exposed on a daily basis to the risks and dangers involved in managing an increasingly violent criminal population. In sum, the Legislature’s focus in enacting and amending General Municipal Law § 207-c has been to provide benefits to persons for injuries arising from the heightened risks and duties to which they are exposed in their special work.

Published on:

A New York Criminal Lawyer said the defendant was indicted by a Nassau County Grand Jury on September 23, 1985, charged with Grand Larceny, Second Degree. In the indictment, it is alleged that, on or about July 15, 1985, the defendant stole a 1984 Pontiac Trans-Am from Robert Chevrolet, an automobile dealership in Hicksville, New York.

The defendant has moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the prosecution of the indictment is barred by dint of a previous prosecution, pursuant to section 40.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law. In support of his motion, the defendant alleges the following facts: Upon information and belief, the defendant appeared on September 25, 1985 in Passaic County New Jersey Superior Court and was sentenced to four years in a correctional facility for receiving stolen property. The receiving stolen property conviction was based on the defendant’s having been arrested on July 16, 1985 in Passaic County in possession of the same 1984 Pontiac automobile that he allegedly stole in Nassau County on July 15, 1985 from Robert Chevrolet.

On August 19, 1985 the defendant was charged in a felony complaint with stealing the aforesaid Pontiac, and on September 23, 1985 he was indicted for Grand Larceny in the Third Degree in connection with that alleged theft. The People do not contest the factual allegations set forth by defense counsel, only his legal conclusions.

Published on:

Defendant moves by writ of habeas corpus to dismiss an indictment pending against him in this court by reason of the People’s failure to bring said indictment on for trial within a period of 180 days.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that on June 30, 1959, defendant was sentenced to Sing Sing Prison upon a judgment of conviction. Prior thereto, on January 21, 1959, and March 23, 1959, warrants had been lodged against defendant by reason of information filed charging defendant with violations of sections 1290, 1293-a and 1294 of the Penal Law. These warrants were, thereafter, lodged with the warden of Sing Sing Prison. Defendant alleges that during his incarceration in state prison he served upon the district attorney of a notice to dispose of any untried indictment, information, or complaint pending against him. The district attorney acknowledges receipt of such notice on or about October 21, 1959.

On November 17, 1959, the prior information heretofore filed against defendant were superseded by an indictment charging defendant with the crime of grand larceny in the first degree, two counts, and on May 20, 1960, this court entered an order directing that the defendant be delivered to Nassau County for arraignment. Thereafter, on May 31, 1960, defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment and the court appointed counsel to represent him.

Published on:

The defendant applies for three judicial subpoenas duces tecum or subpoena for production evidence to be directed to governmental or municipal entities. These subpoenas would require the production in Court of various police records relating to the crimes charged in the indictment, personnel records of the complainant police officers, records of the District Attorney’s office as to other complaints of assault made by these police officers, and records of the Freeport Human Rights Commission relating to complaints made against these police officers. The District Attorney and the Freeport Police Department have appeared in opposition.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that at the outset we are called upon to determine what issues may properly be considered upon an application pursuant to CPLR 2307. The defendant contends that CPLR 2307 merely charges the Court with the duty of performing an essentially ministerial act. She argues that the sole consideration before the Court is whether original documents or copies should be produced. This proposition is not without support. However, CPLR 2307(b) provides that, as a general rule, the production of photostatic copies constitutes compliance with a subpoena issued under CPLR 2307(a). As the Practice Commentary recognizes, to construe CPLR 2307(a) as requiring only that the Court decide whether originals or copies are to be produced, renders that statute meaningless in light of CPLR 2307(b). This Court cannot so construe an act of the Legislature. Case law indicates that upon an application for a judicial subpoena duces tecum the Court may consider various issues including the materiality and relevancy of the items sought to be subpoenaed, the specificity of the demand, and the public policy involved, if any.

The use which the defendant intends to make of the items which she would have us subpoena is the decisive factor in determining whether these applications should be granted. A subpoena duces tecum may not be used for the purpose of discovery or to ascertain the existence of evidence. Rather, it is a Court process which directs an individual to appear together with books, documents, papers or other items in his possession so that by reference to these items he may give testimony relevant to the matter under inquiry and, through the production of evidence, assist in the pursuit of truth. Where it is apparent that a party does not intend or cannot hope to offer testimony which refers to the items subpoenaed but merely seeks discovery and inspection, his application should be denied.

Published on:

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, in May of this year, members of the Brooklyn Tactical Narcotics Teams arrested the defendants for street level narcotics sales to undercover police officers. In each case, both the arrest and the overt conduct constituting the crimes charged [PL §§ 220.39(1) and 220.16(1) ] occurred entirely within Kings County. “Pursuant to an agreement between the District Attorney of Kings County and the Special Narcotics Prosecutor for the City of New York”, these criminal actions were commenced by the filing of felony complaints in New York County Criminal Court. The People did not obtain transfer orders from the supreme court pursuant to Judiciary Law § 177-b(2).

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, all three defendants were arraigned in New York County, and their cases adjourned to Part N, New York County, for action by the special narcotics grand jury and/or possible disposition by way of waiver of indictment and the filing of a superior court information. When each defendant initially appeared in Part N the People had no grand jury action to report. Counsel orally moved before this court for dismissal of the felony complaints on the ground that the court lacked geographical jurisdiction as defined in CPL § 20.40. With the concurrence of all the parties, the court reserved decision and set a schedule for the filing of written motions and memoranda of law.

The issue is whether article 5-B of the Judiciary Law, which established special narcotics parts of the Supreme Court, or any other provision of law, confers jurisdiction on this court over felony complaints alleging overt criminal conduct wholly occurring in another county.

Published on:

A New York Criminal Lawyer said that, at that time, respondent was at the scene of a drug raid for the purposes of purchasing marijuana. He refused the order of a police officer to leave and was arrested for disorderly conduct. As he was being placed under arrest, he pulled out a six-inch hunting knife and attempted to stab the officer. As a result, he was also charged with attempted assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Following arraignment on these charges, he was released on his own recognizance and then engaged in various criminal acts in New Jersey, which resulted in his arrest and confinement at Greystone Psychiatric Center. During his confinement, which lasted from May 17, 1984 until April 29, 1986, respondent reported aural and visual hallucinations, claiming in one instance that he was seeing snakes, bugs and images of Satan and was hearing voices telling him to get a gun and blow his brains out. He also claimed that he communicated with God, worked for God, was God, that he feared that Satan would kill him because he was an archangel, and that he was depressed and wanted to die.

A New York Criminal Lawyer said as a result of the observations as well as examinations of respondent, was diagnosed as a chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic with acute exacerbation. His treating psychiatrist prescribed a high dosage of anti-psychotic medication. Greystone’s doctors agreed that he presented a danger to himself and others and thus, despite the medication’s beneficial effects, required continued hospitalization on a closed ward until he was stabilized on it. On August 21, 1984, S. escaped from Greystone using a spoon he had fashioned into a key that could open a security lock. He was quickly apprehended, returned to Greystone, and ultimately stabilized on Prolixin.

A New York Domestic Violence Lawyer said that, on April 29, 1986, S. was discharged from Greystone and extradited to New York to face prosecution on the 1983 attempted assault and weapon charges. The discharge diagnosis reported that he remained a chronic undifferentiated schizophrenic but was in remission because of his hospitalization and treatment at Greystone, and was no longer hostile or violent. The doctor who discharged S. recommended that he receive aftercare at a local New York City mental health center upon release from custody.

Contact Information